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Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy:
The Future of the World Trade Organization
Claude E. Barfleld*

I. INTRODUCTION

The World Trade Organization ("WTO"), only six years old, faces two
formidable challenges. First, it must mobilize support to confront determined and
growing attacks from outside groups and individuals who proclaim that the
organization lacks democratic accountability and is merely a front for multinational
corporations and dehumanizing capitalist values. Second, even as it attempts to
mobilize its resources to meet these onslaughts, the WTO finds its own institutional
viability jeopardized by internal constitutional flaws that play into the hands of
opponents: namely, the pressure to 'legislate" new rules-through a highly efficient
new dispute settlement system-that flout the mandate that dispute settlement
judgments must neither add to nor diminish the existing rights and obligations of
WTO members.
The United States faces a different, though related, set of challenges. In a world
of increasing technological and economic integration, it must continue to balance and
rebalance a defense of national sovereignty against grants of authority over economic
and social policy to international organizations such as the WTO. The United States
must also devise domestic political mechanisms that provide greater democratic
accountability with regard to decisions affecting US international obligations.

The first draft of this article was completed during the week of the United
Nations "Millennium Summit" in early September 2000. On the opening day of the
summit, the New York Times interviewed leaders of the anti-globalist movement who
Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute. This article is a shortened version of the
Introduction and Executive Summary of Recomnendations in a forthcoming study of the World Trade
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stated that, in contrast to Seattle, their groups were in New York not to protest but to
give support to the UN: "We've lately begun to worry that the mandate (of the UN]
was weakening, and that the same ideologies that drive the WTO will appear in the
United Nations ...
It is our role to still insist and assert that the United Nations is
not a body that should be siding with the interests of capitalists..."' I had to chuckle
because I had just finished writing a book that stemmed, at least in part, from the fear
that the ideological flow was in the opposite direction-that the free market
principles embodied in the rules of the WTO would be suborned by protectionism in
the name of other social, economic, or political interests.
The day after that news item appeared, the New York Times published a second
article that is also directly relevant to this study It reported that the European
Union had rejected as still inadequate a US effort to come into compliance with the
ruling of a VWTO panel that the United States had granted an illegal export subsidy to
American companies.
This had ominous implications. Stuart Eizenstat, the deputy secretary of the
US Treasury, had warned in July that a "major trade war" could ensue if the two sides
could not come to some agreement. 4 Sanctions in the WTO are based upon the
amount of harm suffered in the international marketplace by the complaining country.
Using that metric, the EU calculates that it could seek 100 percent tariffs on $4 billion
of US exports.'
Should this occur, it would be far and away the largest retaliation taken under
the new WTO dispute settlement system. It would come on top of two other
corrosive quarrels between the two trading partners. In one, the US has levied some
$200 million in tariffs on European goods after the EU refused to alter its restrictions
on banana imports from Central America; and in the second, the US has levied over
$100 million in tariffs on European goods because the EU has banned hormonetreated beef.
Taken together, these snapshots of the current travails of the WTO create a
picture of the current state of the organization. The WTO faces enormous new
pressures from the outside, with the emergence of powerful anti-globalist sentiment
matched by determined new transnational interest groups that are effectively
exploiting that sentiment. At the same time, the WTO is saddled with a
constitutional structure that may cripple its ability both to deal with its external
antagonists and-of greater importance-to settle disputes between member states in
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a manner that upholds the rules and at the same time is satisfactory to the contending
parties.
The appearance of large numbers of groups that support the UN and explicitly
link that support to opposition to the free trade mandate of the WTO validates the
assumption that it is no longer possible to analyze the WTO and the international
trading system in isolation from other multinational organizations and regimes,
particularly the UN and the vastly increased number of international environmental
treaties, agreements, and declarations. Virtually unheralded, the ambition and reach
of UN leaders and programs have grown mightily since the end of the Cold War.
Similarly, over the past three decades, the number of environmental agreementsmany with trade sanctions as the compliance weapon of choice-has multiplied,
resulting in a plethora of international rules on matters such as hazardous wastes, the
ozone layer, biological diversity, endangered species, wildlife preservation, wetlands,
migratory species, marine pollution, transboundary air pollution, tropical timber, and
Antarctica. This has already led to clashes between trade and environmental rules, as
demonstrated by the WTO Shrimp/turtle and Tuna/dolphin cases.
The aforementioned interview with the head of a non-governmental
organization ("NGO") underscores another major phenomenon of the past decade:
the emergence across a wide policy landscape of groups of politically and rhetorically
powerful "citizen activists" who vigorously lobby governments at all levels
(subnational, national, and international) on all manner of issues, from trade and the

environment to consumers' rights, human rights, women's rights, childrens rights, and
animal rights.' Many, though by no means all, of these "citizen activists" groups
directly challenge the predominant capitalist beliefs of wealth creation and hold that
other social, environmental, and spiritual values are being sacrificed on the altars of
free trade and footloose capital movements.
Though many NGOs are local and small, the environmental and consumer
groups that have taken the lead in challenging the WTO and the doctrine of free
trade have very large budgets and payrolls and operate in many countries. For
instance, Greenpeace operates in 20 countries and has an annual income of almost
$100 million; the World Wildlife Fund operates in 28 countries and has an annual
income of about $164 million; Friends of the Earth International operates in 50
countries with an income of $320 million. These formidable resources mean that the
largest and most powerful NGOs can heavily outmatch the resources that many
6.
7.

For fiurther information on the VTO Shrimp/turtle and Tuna/dolphin ca=e, see Claude Barfield,
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members of the WTO can bring to bear-an important factor when considering
demands for more transparency and "public" participation in the dispute settlement
(and legislative) systems of the WTO.
In their broadest reach, "participatory" theories advanced by some NGOs posit a
new "democratic" international order in which NGOs would offer an "alternate form
of representation" in competition with governments, while others argue for an
International Labor Organization model in which governments, corporations, and
NGOs work in partnership to create new rules for an emerging international order.
In the short term, the focus is on access and more direct participation in both the
dispute settlement and the rule-making activities of the WTO. It can be readily
conceded that, in the past, corporate interests have predominated in the corridors of
the WTO (not through any conspiracy, but largely because few, outside of exporters
and importers, really cared about the level of tariffs on the borders). The solution to
this problem, however, is not to allow NGOs and corporations into the negotiations
and the dispute settlement process, but to place them both firmly on an equal footing
outside the door of the negotiating room and judicial chamber. WTO dispute
settlement procedures should be reformed to allow greater transparency and the
introduction of more varied viewpoints into the process-for instance, through
broadening the professional backgrounds of members of WTO dispute panels.
The WTO as "World Court"- The WTO is overextended and in danger of losing
authority and legitimacy as the arbiter of trade disputes among the world's major
trading nations. In explaining how this came about, the clich6d aphorism, "Be careful
what you wish for" is apt. The situation faced today by the WTO flows directly from
the great success of the Uruguay Round, which hugely extended the substantive
mandate of the international trade regime. Rules for service industries-banks,
insurance companies, telecommunications and internet regulation, energy services,
transportation, et cetera-meant that the trade regime now would be asked to deal
with complex issues that go deep into the economic and social structures of its
member states (and with the telecommunications annex, the WTO actually has
negotiated a competition policy agreement). Added to this was a wholly new regime
for intellectual property ("IP"), introduced at a time of great ferment within individual
nations over the challenges to IP brought about by new technologies such as software
and biotechnology.
The point is that many of these new substantive obligations cannot be solved by
simple protectionist versus non-protectionist answers, as was the case with tariffs. As
Sylvia Ostry has written of the new system: "The degree of intrusiveness into
domestic sovereignty bears little resemblance to the shallow integration of the GATT
with its focus on border barriers ....
The WTO had shifted from the GATT model

Vt/. 2 NO. 2

free Trade,Sovere~ny, 'Democray

of negative regulation-whats governments must not do-to positive regulations, or
what governments must do."
Yet the Uruguay Round negotiators placed on top of these extremely difficult
new substantive challenges a much more rigid, judicialized dispute settlement system
that promised legal certainty and finality in each case. Also, under the new system, a
ruling by a WTO panel or the Appellate Body ("AB") will stand unless there is a
consensus among WTO members (acting as members of the new Dispute Settlement
Body ("DSB")) against the decision.
In a recent essay, Professor J.H.H. Weiler of the Harvard Law School has
contrasted the "diplomatic ethos" of the old General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT")-where "empanelment was, indeed, a continuation of diplomacy by other
means," where "confidentiality" was highly prized, and where disputes were handled
by "trade diplomats"-with the quite different paradigm of the "Rule of Lawyers and
the Culture of Law" adopted under the new WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding ("DSU") in 1995. 9 Arguing that "much of the legal culture is at odds
with the ethos of diplomacy," he lists crucial differences, including."
o In contrast to GATT "diplomatic" solutions that aimed for accommodation
among disputants, "Legal disputes [in the VTO] which go to adjudication
are not settled; they are won and lost. The headlines speak of 'victory and
'defeat."'
* Though the rule of law is supposed to be dispassionate and objective, it is not
so when two parties both believe the law is on their side and litigate: "Then it
becomes a profession of passion, of rhetoric, of a desire to win ...
all inimical
to compromise ....
There are to my knowledge less than a handful of cases in
the history of the WTO where a compromise was found and a dispute settled
once a Panel started its work." u
o Likewise, though the legal professionals directing the process should act in an
objective manner regarding the merits of a case, in reality, they are (like other
professionals) "people with ambition, with a search for job satisfaction:

8.
9.
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this article, his description of the two paradigms is dead on.
Idat 7.
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Thus: "A huge factor in the decision whether to go for legal resolution will
have been the conscious and often subconscious input by lawyers driven by
ambition and their particular professional deformations. The 'we can win in
court ...' becomes in the hands of all too many lawyers an almost automatic
trigger to 'we should bring the case.""'
Though the WTO members did not understand the constitutional
implications of the creation of the AB, the new DSU in effect made it a "high
court" and gave it the final word in interpreting the WTO agreements: "De
jure the DSU leaves the final interpretation of the Agreements in the hands of
the General Council and Ministerial Conference. De facto, unless the
Organization is to break the hallowed principle of consensus, that power has
shifted to the Appellate Body."" In turn, what the AB has told the panels is
that their main goal should no longer be compromise and getting agreement
from both parties. Rather, "It is 'getting it (legally) right,' and/or 'making it
appeal-proof.
In its present form the new judicialized" WTO dispute settlement system is
substantively and politically unsustainable. Substantively, there is no real consensus
among WTO members on many of the complex regulatory issues that the panels and
the AB will be asked to rule upon, and in many instances the underlying treaty text
contains gaps, ambiguities, and contradictory language. Politically, the imbalance
between the ineffective rulemaking procedures and the highly efficient judicial
mechanisms will increasingly pressure the panels and the AB to "create" law, raising
intractable questions of democratic legitimacy. In response to these flaws, alternatives
should be pursued that will reintroduce some of the former elements of "diplomatic"
flexibility that characterized the earlier GATT regime. 6 Conciliation, mediation, and
voluntary arbitration need to be added as real substitutes, and decisions that are
clearly opposed by a substantial minority of WTO members should be set aside by a

13.
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Two close observers of international organizations, and the WTO in particular, Robert Keohane
and Joseph Nye, have recently warned that because they lack strong political ties to domestic
political processes and constituencies, "the legitimacy of global institutions will probably remain
shaky for many decades." For this reason, they also state: "Putting too much weight on international
institutions before they are sufficiently legitimate to bear that responsibility, is a recipe for deadlock,
disruptions and failure: Though the two political scientists may not agree with the specific
proposals in this article and in the larger affiliated study, they are being advanced with their
admonitions and warnings very much in mind. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr, The Club
Model of Multilateral Cooperation and the World Trade Organization: Problems of Democratic Legitimacy,
Paper presented at the Conference on Efficiency, Equity and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading
System at the Millennium, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (June 1-2, 2000).
Available online at <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/trade/keohane.htm> (visited Sept 30, 2001).
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blocking mechanism until further negotiations can produce a consensus. In addition,
the current welfare-reducing systems of sanctions should be replaced with provisions
for compensation, either through fines or trade-liberalization measures to offset the
economic effect of rules violations.
Sovereignty-In a March 2000 speech, John Jackson of Georgetown University,
one of the two deans of GATT/WTO legal scholarship in the United States (the
other being Robert Hudec, now at Tufts University), warned scholars of the
international trading system against falling back on a series of "mantras," which in
Jackson's opinion are phrases that "are used to avoid thinking certain issues through." 7
Two of the phrases he lists are "sovereignty" and "government to government" (when
describing the workings of the WTO).
It is indeed important to think through both phrases as they relate to the future
of the WTO and US participation in that institution. As political scientist Stephen
Krasner has conceptualized it, sovereignty has many dimensions, two of which are
central to the issues dealt with in this article: Westphalian sovereignty, which refers to
the exclusion of foreign actors from domestic decisionmaking; and interdependence,
which refers to a nation's control over the cross-border movement of goods, services,
capital, labor, and information." Responding to those who argue that the sovereignty
of the nation state was once internally and externally "exclusive and absolute," but now
has been eroded by transportation and communications advances, globalism in
general, and the rise of NGOs, Krasner shows that sovereignty was never absolute
and was always "frail as a legal principle." Thus the contemporary trends are part of
the warp and woof of historical cycles. 9 One does not have to adopt Krasner's
ultimately "realist" thesis (that legal sovereignty was always "organized hypocrisy" that
disguised more fundamental divisions of power, and that nations ignored it at will in
the pursuit of national interests) to adopt his historical judgment that sovereignty in
its Westphalian form has always consisted of balancing judgments regarding the
distribution of power between the nation state and international alliances and
organizations.
Jackson similarly argues for thinking about sovereignty "as a decision about how
to allocate power ... (and) about how to correctly design that allocation."a Agreedand it should be stated up front that the conclusions in this article proceed from the
belief that even with the revolution in communications and transportation
technologies, even with globalization and the rise of vociferous NGOs who clamor for

17.
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recognition and shared power, fundamental democratic legitimacy still is a monopoly
of constitutionally constructed democratic states.
In Why Sovereignty Matters, a book published by the American Enterprise
Institute several years ago, Jeremy Rabkin argued that, as then constituted, "the
trading system is quite compatible with traditional notions of sovereignty."2 He
noted, for instance, that it focused only on goods and services that cross international
borders and not on how they were produced inside the borders; that it operated with
ad hoc panels which did not build "ambitious 'case law" that would go beyond
negotiated rules; that neither firms nor individuals had direct recourse to the dispute
settlement system; and that, unlike the North American Free Trade Agreement, there
were no linkages to broader non-trade issues such as labor and the environment.'
Pressures are growing that would reverse most of the virtuous characteristics that
Rabkin cited.
In addition, Rabkin to some degree misdiagnosed a potential ill. He worried
about the new amending procedures for new rules. While admitting that the hurdles
for such amendments were quite high, he expressed some concern that the United
States might be outvoted and that the WTO could move in directions more intrusive
to the US constitutional system.23 What he did not foresee was a very different
problem: the great inefficiency of the WTO rulemaking (legislative) procedures has
greatly increased pressure on the dispute settlement system (the judicial branch) to
create new rules or reinterpret old rules through the back door. Further, WTO
panels and the AB are already being pressed to include "soft" and customary law as
precedents for their decisions-a practice Rabkin strongly condemned in his book.
There are two final points. The recommendations made at the end of this article
admittedly cannot be put into place in the current climate of deep division within the
WTO and given the high hurdles that face any attempt to create new rules or amend
old rules under the current system. Change on the order recommended here will be
possible only as a part of an overall negotiating package in a future trade round, and it
will only come about after a significant number of WTO members-both from
developing and developed countries-perceive that, while the new WTO is and
should remain an important force for more open markets and enhanced competition
among countries, its present constitution is actually an obstacle to those goals.
Finally, it should be noted that these recommendations come in the midst of
major reevaluations of the Bretton Woods institutions established at the end of the
Second World War. Last year, the Meltzer Commission issued a scathing report on
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, arguing that they had greatly
exceeded their original mandates, were overextended and could not deliver on the
21.
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goals they set for themselves. 2 The WTO is in somewhat better shape; the Uruguay
Round represented an important first step toward reform and reshaping the
institution to meet new challenges over the coming decades.
John Jackson has noted the "folly' of the desire of "some people in the United
States [to] reverse course and take the WTO back to the time when it was only
responsible for border measures."' While I do not agree with "some people" I would
argue: (1) that in order to deal with the complex new issues presented by national
regulations inside the border, the WTO will have to adopt a less rigid, more flexible
dispute settlement system, one that does not promise a "correct" legal answer to every
problem; and (2) that the best means of achieving continued democratic legitimacy is
for the WTO to remain a "government-to-government organization, one in which
governments take decisions in the VITO after having sorted through and resolved
conflicting claims and the demands of competing interests in the domestic political
process.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

1. Forced Conciliation, Mediation and Voluntary Arbitration.
The goal of the first and second recommendations is to partially move the WTO
dispute settlement system back in the direction of the original "diplomatic" model for
dispute settlement, and away from the judicial model introduced by the new DSU of
the Uruguay Round. With that aim in mind, the first recommendation is that the
Director General or a special standing committee of the DSB be empowered to step
in and direct that the contending WTO member states settle their differences
through bilateral negotiations, through mediation or by agreeing to arbitration by an
outside party. The criteria for such action would include situations where the highly
divisive political nature of the contest would cause permanent damage to the WTO or
where, in thejudgment of the Director General (or of a DSB Committee), there is no
established legislative rule or where the existing language papered over deep
substantive divisions among WTO members.
2. Repairing a Constitutional Flaw: A Blocking Minority.
The goal of the second recommendation is to redress the imbalance between the
highly efficient dispute settlement system and the ineffective, consensus-plagued
24.
25.

See International Financial Institution Advisor, Commission Report to the Senate Committee on
Banking. Housing, and Urban Affairs, S Hrg 106-579, 106th Cong. 2d Sess 1-8 (2000).
Jackson, 4J Ind Econ L at 70 (cited in note 17).
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rulemaking procedures. This will be accomplished through a doubly calculated
minority blocking mechanism; thus, at any time at least one-third of the members of
the DSB, amounting to at least one-quarter of total trade among WTO members,
register opposition to a panel or AB decision, that decision shall be set asideblocked-and the DSB should affirm that it is not binding WTO law. Subsequently,
the normal legislative process of the WTO should be invoked through action by the
General Council either to amend existing rules or to establish new rules. If the
General Council cannot reach consensus and agreement, then the issue will be left to
be settled at the next major round of WTO trade negotiations, as part of a larger
package of compromises. It is expected that, even with the establishment of these
"diplomatic" escape clauses (mediation, blocking minority), a vast majority of disputes
would still be handled through the DSU negotiated during the Uruguay Round.
3. Compliance: Substitute Compensation for Retaliation.
Under this proposal, the existing option of compensation would become the sole
remedy for non-compliance with a panel or AB ruling. Two alternative methods of
compensation should be considered as options. First, compensation could be exacted
through a monetary fine on the offending nation, with the sum of the fine calculated
by a neutral third party or subcommittee of the DSB. Second, the offending WTO
member could agree to institute trade liberalization equivalent in commercial value to
the cost of the trade barrier(s) to the complaining country. Again, the commercial
cost of the trade barrier would be determined by a neutral third party.
4. Direct Effect.
Under the doctrine of direct effect, a nation agrees that its domestic laws will be
bound by rules negotiated under a treaty. Direct effect gives a private citizen the
power to demand relief from, or bring a claim against, another private citizen or the
state itself pursuant to the terms of an international agreement. Clearly, adherence to
the direct effect doctrine alters the relationship between the state, private actors, and
domestic courts. The recommendation is that the US Congress, as it has in four
recent trade agreements, continue to explicitly deny both direct effect and the selfexecution of a treaty. As recent multilateral, regional and bilateral trade agreements
have produced rules that attempt to regulate areas central to domestic governanceservices, intellectual property, investment-it is imperative that national legislatures,
including the US Congress, exert greater vigilance in retaining the final determination
over the content of these core elements of domestic regulation.
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B. TRANSPARENCY

5. Publication of Documents.
The WTO should establish rules that provide for the publication of all
government documents submitted pursuant to a panel or AB proceeding at the time
they are presented. Such documents should be posted on the Internet. Information
that is confidential for businesses would continue to be protected.
6. Public Access to Dispute Settlement Proceedings.
If, as recommended here, all government documents are published when
presented, it would also make sense to provide for public access to the opening
sessions of both the panels and the AB. This would allow interested parties and the
public to observe opening arguments of all participants, including third parties. This
would protect the process from undue pressure while later questions and colloquy
proceed and, at the same time, would allow for widespread dissemination of the basic,
underlying issues.
7. Amicus Briefs.
The DSB should exert strong pressure on the AB to review and withdraw its
decision to allow acceptance of amicus briefs by itself and the panels. As noted in the
text, Australia has taken the lead in urging WTO members to begin drafting rules on
amicus briefs that will ensure the safeguarding of members' equity, transparency and
due process and impose "necessary disciplines" on acceptance of such briefs. As the
representatives of developing countries have argued, the issue goes beyond questions
of process and raises questions of equity in that smaller countries could be continually
outgunned by the vast legal resources of multinational corporations and NGOs. In
the future, the WTO may well decide to allow outside documents to be included in
dispute settlement proceedings; but this decision, and the conditions surrounding the
introduction of such documents, should be negotiated by WTO members, and not
introduced through the back door by the AB.
C. PARTICIPATION

8. Expand Diversity of Panels.
The language of the DSU clearly foresees that, in addition to trade experts, nontrade specialists should be recruited for cases that involve issues beyond commercial
rules. Taking advantage of this flexibility, the WTO should move quickly to assemble
expert panelists from such allied fields as the environment, food safety, genetics, and
the intricacies of intellectual property. The net should be cast widely, with scientists
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and social scientists added to the usual list of lawyers, legal scholars, and retired
diplomats.
9. Public Hearing During Conciliation, Mediation Proceedings.
Should the proposal advanced above for a less judicialized mediation and
conciliation mechanism be accepted, a corollary recommendation would be for the
Director General to be given the authority by the parties to convene a public hearing
at which a moderator would take testimony from experts and then suggest a solution
acceptable to all parties. Even if the moderator failed to satisfy the parties, the process
would benefit by the expert testimony and a public exploration of the issues.
10. Formal Consultation.
Building on the experience of the WTO Committee on Trade and the
Environment, the WTO should institute a systematic method of consultation with
interested outside groups and experts, including NGOs, scientific and professional
societies, and corporate associations. The WTO Secretariat should be encouraged
and empowered to convene a continuous series of seminars, symposia, and larger
conferences to inform WTO members and staff of the technical issues raised by
WTO rules and by disputes among members.
D. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

11. Bipartisan
Committee.

Commission

and

Permanent

Joint

Congressional

As a means of increasing the democratic accountability and legitimacy of the
WTO, national legislatures should become much more involved in, or at least aware
of, the construction of rules and regulations passed by international organizations.
The recommendation is that as a first step, the US Congress should establish a
bipartisan commission that would be assigned two tasks: (1) to report on the
implications of the WTO dispute settlement system on the US constitutional system
and on US domestic laws and regulations; and (2) to report on the cumulative impact
of rulings, pronouncements, and resolutions that have emerged from major UN
organizations such as the Economic and Social Council, the International Labor
Organization, the World Health Organization, and the Food and Agricultural
Organization (thus, including the environment, human rights, health policy, social
development, population policy, and children's and women's rights). The goal of the
commission would be to provide the Congress with a greater understanding of the full
implications of the growing number of international policy pronouncements on US
domestic policy.
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Congress should also consider establishing a permanent joint committee to
provide continuing oversight and analysis of rules passed by international bodies that
have an impact on US domestic laws and regulations.
E. EMINENT PERSONS GROUP

12. Eminent Persons Group.
The WTO should establish an Eminent Persons Group (as it did with
commendable results during the 1980s) to examine the systemic problems and issues
surrounding WTO governance and the relationship between the WTO and other
international regimes, particularly the future relationship with the Multilateral
Environmental Agreements. Regarding WTO governance, two issues would lead the
agenda: (1) how to reform the executive functioning of the WTO in a manner that
accommodates the complaints of exclusion by developing countries, while at the same
time streamlines the process of decision-making; and (2) how to reform the legislative
andjudicial functions so that a more viable balance can be achieved, in order to relieve
pressure on the dispute settlement system to create law and change the rights and
obligations of WTO members.
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